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Abstract
From the beginning of 2003 to the spring of 2004, Japan's monetary authorities
conducted large-scale yen-selling/dollar-buying operations in what John Taylor has
labeled the \Great Intervention." This paper examines the relationship between
this \Great Intervention" and the quantitative easing policy the Bank of Japan
was pursuing at that time. First, we nd that about 40 percent of the yen funds
supplied to the market by yen-selling interventions were not oset by the BOJ's
monetary operations, and remained in the market for a while; this is in contrast
with the preceding period, when almost 100 percent were immediately oset. Sec-
ond, comparing interventions and other government payments, the extent to which
the funds were oset were much smaller in the case of interventions, suggesting
that the BOJ dierentiated between and responded dierently to interventions and
other government payments. These two ndings indicate that it is likely that the
BOJ intentionally did not sterilize yen-selling interventions to achieve its policy
target of maintaining current account balances of commercial banks at the BOJ at
a high level. Finally, we nd that an unsterilized intervention had a greater impact
on the yen-dollar rate than a sterilized one did, indicating that it matters whether
an intervention is sterilized or not even when the economy is in a liquidity trap.
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1 Introduction
During the period from 2001 to 2006, the Japanese monetary authorities pursued two
interesting policies. The rst of these is the quantitative easing policy introduced by
the Bank of Japan (BOJ) in March 2001. This step was motivated by the fact that
although the overnight call rate, the BOJ's policy rate, had reached its lower bound at
zero percent, it failed to suciently stimulate the economy. To achieve further mone-
tary easing, the BOJ therefore changed the policy variable from the interest rate to the
money supply. The quantitative easing policy remained in place until March 2006, by
which time the Japanese economy had started to recover. The second major policy dur-
ing this period were interventions in the foreign exchange market by Japan's Ministry
of Finance (MOF) and the BOJ, which engaged in large-scale selling of the yen from
January 2003 to March 2004. Taylor (2006) has called this the \Great Intervention."
The interventions during this period occurred at a frequency of once every two busi-
ness days, with the amount involved per daily intervention averaging 286 billion yen
and the total reaching 35 trillion yen. Even for Japan's monetary authorities, which
are known for their active interventionism, this frequency as well as the sums involved
were unprecedented.
The main interest of this paper is on how these two policies were related to each
other. Researchers often maintain that monetary policy and exchange rate interventions
are independent policies.1 That is, in a normal situation, monetary policy is conducted
by setting a target level for very short-term interest rates (e.g., the federal funds rate
in the US, the overnight call rate in Japan) and adjusting the quantity of base money
on a daily basis to maintain that level. If the amount of yen funds circulating in the
market increases or decreases as a result of foreign exchange interventions, overnight
interest rates will deviate from the target level. Then the central bank will use open
market operations to oset the funds supplied to or absorbed from the market by the
foreign exchange interventions. The central banks of the advanced economies sterilize
foreign exchange interventions in this way - an observation that has been conrmed
by a large number of empirical studies. As long as such sterilization is conducted,
monetary policy and foreign exchange interventions are not mutually related.
But did such sterilization also occur even during the period of the \Great Inter-
vention"? In addressing this question, it should be noted that the target level of the
overnight call rate was practically zero during this period. Therefore, even if yen funds
1See, for example, Craig and Humpage (2001).
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are supplied to the market by yen-selling interventions, the overnight rate, which is
already zero, will not deviate from the target level, so that the BOJ does not need to
sterilize those interventions. Rather, the BOJ has a reason to actively choose not to
sterilize them, because the yen funds supplied by intervention help them to increase
base money, thereby achieving the target for current account balances of commercial
banks at the BOJ.
Taylor (2006) points out that the reason why the US Treasury, which in the past
had been critical of Japan's yen-selling interventions, approved such interventions at
this period is that they provided additional support for the BOJ's quantitative easing
policy. According to this view, Japan's MOF conducted large-scale yen-selling inter-
ventions, which the BOJ did not sterilize, thus allowing an increase in base money,
which eventually led to the recovery of the Japanese economy.2 In contrast, the BOJ
maintained that there was no causal relationship between large-scale yen-selling in-
terventions and quantitative easing. For example, responding to the report in August
2003 that both yen-selling interventions and the increase in the outstanding balance
of current accounts at the BOJ since the beginning of the year amounted to about 10
trillion yen, the Deputy Governor of the BOJ, Kazumasa Iwata, simply stated that
this was \coincidence."3
Using daily data of current account balances at the BOJ and the amount of foreign
exchange interventions, we nd that around 60 percent of the yen funds supplied to
the market by yen-selling interventions were oset by monetary operations by the BOJ
(i.e., sterilized), while the remaining 40 percent were not oset. Moreover, the funds
that were not oset remained in the market for a while. This is in contrast with the
preceding period when nearly 100 percent were oset immediately. We also nd that,
comparing interventions and other government payments, the extent to which the funds
were oset were much smaller in the case of interventions, suggesting that the BOJ
dierentiated between and responded dierently to interventions and other government
payments. These two ndings indicate that it is likely that the BOJ intentionally did
not sterilize yen-selling interventions to achieve its policy target of maintaining current
account balances of commercial banks at the BOJ at a high level. Finally, we nd that
an unsterilized intervention had a greater impact on the yen-dollar rate than a sterilized
2The same point was made at the time by Svensson (2001) and Hamada (1999) among others.
3However, the Governor in a statement in December 1999 acknowledged that the BOJ employed the
method of increasing the money base by leaving the funds of yen-selling foreign exchange interventions
in the market, saying that \the BOJ has been exibly providing ample funds to the short-term money
market taking account of factors including yen liquidity arising from foreign exchange intervention."
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one did, indicating that it matters whether an intervention is sterilized or not even when
the economy is in a liquidity trap. This result suggests that unsterilized interventions
aected the exchange rate through a change in market participants' expectations about
future money supply.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section explains the quanti-
tative easing policy and the \Great Intervention" in more details. Section 3 investigates
the contemporaneous correlation between interventions and changes in current account
balances at the BOJ, while Section 4 examines dynamic relationship between the two.
Section 5 asks whether sterilized and unsterilized interventions had dierent eects on
the exchange rate even when the economy is in a liquidity trap. Section 6 concludes
the paper.
2 The Quantitative Easing Policy and the Great Inter-
vention
2.1 The quantitative easing policy
The BOJ decided to introduce its quantitative easing policy on March 19, 2001 (see
Table 1 for a chronology of monetary policy measures in Japan).4 The aim of this
policy was to stimulate eective demand by providing ample supplies of base money.
The target level of outstanding current account balances at the BOJ was initially set
at 5 trillion yen, meaning that the target level exceeded the level of required reserve,
which was approximately 4 trillion yen, by about 1 trillion yen.
We would like to highlight two features of the quantitative easing policy, which are
often overlooked by researchers but have some important implications in examining the
relationship with foreign exchange interventions. The rst of these is that there were
frequent changes in the target level of current account balances at the BOJ. After the
initial level had been set at 5 trillion yen in March 2001, this was raised to 6 trillion yen
less than half a year later, in August 2001. By December of that year, the target level
was further increased to a range of 10-15 trillion yen, and the target continued to be
raised at relatively short intervals until it nally reached 30-35 trillion yen in January
2004. What is important is not only that the target of current account balances was
4The BOJ adopted its zero interest rate policy aiming to keep the target level of the overnight
interest rate at zero in February 1999 and maintained this until August 2000. Although the zero
interest rate policy and the quantitative easing policy have in common that they aim to maintain the
overnight interest rate at zero, the latter diers in the way that it seeks to aect aggregate demand not
through the price channel (i.e. the interest rate channel) but through the various quantity channels,
including the so-called portfolio rebalance channel.
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Table 1: Chronology of Monetary Policy Decisions in 1999-2006
Dates Events
09/09/98 The BOJ reduces the target O/N rate to 0.25 from 0.50 percent
02/12/99 The BOJ introduces a zero interest rate policy (ZIRP)
04/13/99 Governor Masaru Hayami announces the BOJ will continue the ZIRP
until \deationary concerns are dispelled"
10/13/99 The BOJ expands the range of money market operations
08/11/00 The BOJ terminates the ZIRP and increases the target O/N rate to 0.25 percent
02/09/01 The BOJ introduces Lombard-type lending facility
and reduces the ocial discount rate to 0.375 from 0.5 percent
02/28/01 The BOJ reduces the target O/N rate to 0.125 percent
and the ocial discount rate to 0.25 percent
03/19/01 The BOJ introduces a quantitative easing policy
and announces to continue it until \the core CPI records a year-on-year
increase of zero percent or more on a stable basis."
The BOJ sets the target current account balance (CAB) at 5 trillion yen
08/14/01 The BOJ raises the target CAB to 6 trillion yen
09/18/01 The BOJ raises the target CAB to above 6 trillion yen
12/19/01 The BOJ raises the target CAB to 10{15 trillion yen
10/30/02 The BOJ raises the target CAB to 15{20 trillion yen
04/01/03 The BOJ raises the target CAB to 17{22 trillion yen
04/30/03 The BOJ raises the target CAB to 22{27 trillion yen
05/20/03 The BOJ raises the target CAB to 27{30 trillion yen
10/10/03 The BOJ raises the target CAB to 27{32 trillion yen.
The BOJ announces more detailed description of its commitment
regarding the timing to terminate quantitative easing policy
01/20/04 The BOJ raises the target CAB to 30{35 trillion yen
03/09/06 The BOJ terminates quantitative easing policy
07/14/06 The BOJ terminates the ZIRP and sets the target O/N rate at 0.25 percent
at a high level, but also that it was revised quite frequently.
Second, since December 2001, the target of current account balances was no longer
a point value but a range. For example, in January 2004, the range was set at 30-35
trillion yen, meaning that uctuations up to 5 trillion yen were acceptable. Although
the BOJ has not explained why it set a target range or on what basis it decided that
this range would be 5 trillion yen, looking at the BOJ's actual monetary policy conduct
in Figure 1, it is clear that it actually permitted uctuations within this range. This
pattern is especially obvious in the period since 2003, the main period of interest for
this paper. To examine this point in more detail, Figure 2 depicts the distribution of
the actual values of daily current account balances during the period when the target
range was 30-35 trillion yen, i.e., from January 2004 to March 2006. It shows that the
mode of the distribution is at 33.7 trillion yen and the frequency declines toward the
fringes of the range. Thus, it can be conjectured that even though the BOJ had set
a provisional target level of 33.7 trillion yen, it was prepared to accept divergences
from that level at times of large autonomous disturbances through the inow and
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outow of funds, such as foreign exchange interventions. We will discuss more about
the implications of these two properties of the quantitative easing policy in Section 4.
2.2 The Great Intervention
Figure 3 shows the daily value of foreign exchange interventions between 2001 and 2007.
As can be seen, the pattern of interventions is quite remarkable, showing a high fre-
quency of interventions during the period from January 15, 2003 to March 16, 2004. As
described by Ito (2003), it is the MOF, and in particular the Vice Minister of Finance
for International Aairs, who plays a leading role in foreign exchange interventions,
and it is conspicuous that interventions were concentrated in the period when Zembei
Mizoguchi was in this post. Compared with the period of his predecessors, Sakakibara
and Kuroda (who held the post between June 1995 and January 2002), the frequency
of interventions increased remarkably from, on average, once every forty days to once
every two days. Moreover, whereas the total amount of interventions under Sakak-
ibara and Kuroda came to 26 trillion yen, under Mizoguchi it reached 35 trillion yen,
providing further indication of the heavy intervention during a short period.
3 Contemporaneous Correlation between Interventions and
Changes in Current Account Balances
We now turn to examining whether there is a correlation between changes in current
account balances and foreign exchange interventions. If there is a positive correlation
between the two, this would mean that foreign exchange interventions were not steril-
ized. Conversely, no correlation would mean that interventions were sterilized.5
Let us begin by examining the relationship between the two with a simple scat-
ter　 plot. Figure 4 plots daily data with the horizontal axis depicting the value of
interventions and the vertical axis showing the change in current account balances.
The sample consists of observations from 1992 onward and is divided into the periods
before and after December 19, 2001, the date on which the BOJ rst set a target range
5In order to conduct yen-selling interventions, the MOF has to nance yen funds. One way to do so
is to issue nancing bills (FBs) on the same day as the intervention is conducted. In that case, because
the MOF immediately returns the yen funds that it obtained by issuing FBs to the market through
the intervention, the amount of yen funds circulating in the market does not change at all. However,
in practice, such an automatic sterilization does not take place because there is a time gap of about
two months between foreign exchange interventions and the issuing of FBs; as a result, when the MOF
intervenes by selling yen, the amount of yen funds circulating at that point in time actually increases
unless the BOJ conducts monetary operations to absorb them. For details on the practicalities of
foreign exchange market interventions in Japan, see Ito (2003).
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for current account balances. Current account balances at the end of day t are denoted
by Rt, while the value of yen sales/dollar purchases conducted on day t is denoted by
It. The vertical axis shows Rt, while the horizontal axis depicts It 2. The value of
interventions at t  2 is used because the settlement of funds takes place two business
days after interventions were executed. As can be seen from Figure 4, there is almost
no correlation between the two in the rst half of the sample period. In contrast, in
the latter half of the sample period, a weak correlation can be observed.
We examine this dierence by estimating a simple equation of the form:
Rt = + It 2 + ut (1)
where ut is an iid disturbance term.6 This specication has been widely used in exist-
ing studies to measure the extent of sterilization. For example, a similar specication
was employed by Fatum and Hutchison (2005) and Ito (2004) to investigate the BOJ's
behavior in the recent period. The results are presented in Table 2. As for the rst
period, we nd that the estimated value of  at -0.004 is close to zero and we cannot
reject the null hypothesis of  = 0. In other words, we cannot reject the hypothesis
that interventions during this period were completely sterilized. In contrast, for the
latter period, at 0.389,  is positive and statistically signicant, suggesting that ap-
proximately 60 percent of the value of foreign exchange interventions was sterilized,
while the remaining 40 percent was not.7
We use equation (1) to conduct a rolling regression in order to examine the change
in the coecient  over time. The window of the rolling regression is the preceding 750
days. The results are presented in Figure 5, which shows the estimated value of  as
well as the 90 percent condence interval. The gure indicates that while until 2000, 
is zero or below zero, it turns positive in September 2001 and from March 2003 onward
becomes large and signicantly dierent from zero. Moreover, after 2003, the value of
 is relatively stable at around 0.4.
6By denition, Rt is equal to commercial banks' net receipt of yen funds on day t from the
government and the central bank. The amount of intervention to be settled on day t, It 2, is a part of
the net receipt from the government, and the amount of monetary operations for sterilization, which
is denoted by  (1  )It 2, is also a part of the net receipt from the central bank. We sum up these
two (i.e., It 2   (1  )It 2 = It 2) to obtain equation (1). Note that all other kinds of commercial
banks' receipt of yen funds from the government and the central bank are included in the disturbance
term ut.
7During the period of the Great Intervention, foreign exchange interventions totaling 35 trillion yen
were carried out. At the same time, current account balances at the BOJ during this period increased
from 20 trillion yen to 33 trillion yen. Interestingly, the increase in current account balances of 13 yen
trillion is equivalent to approximately 40 percent of the value of foreign exchange interventions.
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Table 2: Contemporaneous Correlation between Interventions and Changes in Current
Account Balances
Entire sample period 1992/1/1-2001/12/18 2001/12/19-2006/3/9
Constant -0.016 -0.006 -0.046
(0.009)* (0.011) (0.020)**
It 2 0.188 -0.004 0.389
(0.103)* (0.151) (0.116)***
R2 0.052 0.016 0.162
OBS 3496 2461 1035
Note: Heteroskedasticity-and-autocorrelation-consistent (HAC) standard errors are in
parentheses. The symbols *, **, and *** represent statistically signicant at the 10-
percent level, at the 5-percent level, and at the 1-percent level.
4 Dynamic Relationship between Interventions and Cur-
rent Account Balances
4.1 Did interventions have permanent impacts on current account
balances?
The analysis in the previous section clearly indicates that yen-selling interventions af-
fected current account balances at least on the day of intervention (more precisely, on
the settlement day of intervention) during the Great Intervention period. But how per-
sistent were they? Did interventions have permanent impacts on the level of current
account balances? These are key questions asked by researchers who study optimal
monetary policy in a liquidity trap. Specically, Jeanne and Svensson (2007) and Eg-
gertsson (2006) argue that a permanent increase in base money resulting from a yen-
selling intervention will eectively stimulate aggregate demand even when the economy
is caught by a liquidity trap. According to them, the purchase of foreign currencies by
issuing money (i.e., unsterilized intervention) is an eective device to make a credible
commitment about future reation, because it will incur balance-sheet losses if the
central bank (and the government) reneges on an ination promise, thereby causing
an exchange rate appreciation.
In addressing whether interventions had permanent impact or not, it is important
to note that a permanent increase in current account balances would never be allowed
if the quantitative easing policy is operated by specifying a target level of current
account balances (rather than a target range of them) and there is no overtime change
in the target level, since, in this type of rigid rule, a permanent increase in current
8












Note: See the note for Table 2.
account balances resulting from a yen-selling intervention would simply mean a failure
of targeting policy. However, as we saw in Section 2.1, the quantitative easing policy
adopted by the BOJ was not something like this: the target was specied by the range
and it was updated quite frequently.
There are two possibilities in which interventions have a permanent impact on
current account balances under such a exible policy rule. The rst possibility is that
a yen-selling intervention is settled exactly on the day when the target of current
account balances is updated; therefore yen funds supplied to the market through the
yen-selling intervention can remain there permanently without violating the target
of current account balances. To examine this possibility, we compare the timing of
interventions and the timing of changes in the target of current account balances
during the Great Intervention period. There are ve episodes of changes in the target
of current account balances during the Great Intervention period. In Figure 6, we
show the amounts of interventions to be settled on days before and after the day of a
change in the target of current account balances, day T , for each of the ve episodes.
Figure 6 clearly shows that almost all of large-scale interventions took place without
accompanying a change in the target of current account balances, with an exception
of a large-scale intervention that was settled on May 21, 2003, one day after the target
of current account balances was updated from 22-27 trillion yen to 27-30 trillion yen.
The second possibility is that the target range was wide enough to allow for per-
sistent change in current account balances resulting from interventions. To investigate
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this possibility in more detail, we estimate a policy reaction function of the form:
Rt = + Rt 1 + Rt 1 + It 2 + ut: (2)
The variable Rt is dened as Rt  Rt  1(Rt > RUt or Rt < RLt ), where RUt stands for
the upper limit of the target range and RLt for the lower limit, and 1() represents an
indicator function that takes a value of one if the statement in the bracket is true, and
zero otherwise. That is, Rt equals to Rt when Rt is outside the target range; otherwise
it equals to zero. The parameter  is associated with dynamic adjustment of current
account balances to the desired level, which is given by 1  , when current account
balances are inside the target range: the closer  is to 1, the slower is the convergence
to the desired level. On the other hand,  +  is associated with adjustment to the
desired level when current account balances are outside the target range. The null
hypothesis is that the BOJ permits current account balances to move freely within the
target range (and thus there is no convergence whatsoever), but once current account
balances are outside the range, they converge to the desired level. Under the null
hypothesis, we should expect  = 1 and j+ j < 1.
The estimation result is presented in Table 3. In the estimation, dummy vari-
ables for changes in the target of current account balances are included. Speci-
cally, six dummy variables for the following dates are included: 2002/10/30, 2003/4/1,
2003/4/30, 2003/5/20, 2003/10/10, and 2004/1/20. Each dummy variable takes a value
of one from that date onward, and zero otherwise. The result obtained from a regres-
sion using the entire sample period shows that  is positive but signicantly dierent
from unity, implying that convergence does occur even inside the target range. More
importantly, since  is not signicantly dierent from zero, the dierence in the speed
of convergence between inside and outside the target range is not signicantly large.
These results reject the null hypothesis that the BOJ permitted current account bal-
ances to move freely within the target range, thereby allowing interventions to have a
permanent eect on the level of current account balances.8
8Note that it is assumed in equation (1) that the coecient on Rt 1 is equal to unity, therefore R is
a non-stationary process. This is clearly inconsistent with the result in Table 3. To examine whether R
is a stationary or non-stationary process in a formal way, we conducted a unit root test by estimating
an equation of the form: Rt = +Rt 1+ut with the six dummy variables associated with changes in
the target of current account balances. The critical values of this unit root test are calculated through
simulation. We rejected the null by nding that , which is estimated to be 0.819, is lower than unity
at the 1 percent signicance level.
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4.2 Temporary nonsterilization
The above results clearly rule out the possibility that yen funds supplied though yen-
selling interventions stayed in the market permanently. However, the estimates of 
and  in equation (2) are both positive and signicantly dierent from zero, implying
that some portion of yen funds supplied through interventions stayed in the market
for a while. In other words, non-sterilization is not permanent but temporary. Using
the estimates of  and  of equation (2), we calculate in Figure 7 how quickly (or
slowly) yen funds supplied through yen-selling interventions are oset over time by the
BOJ's subsequent operations. The gure shows that about 60 percent of one trillion yen
supplied through interventions are oset two days after the intervention is implemented
(i.e. the settlement day of the intervention), so that 400 billion yen remains in the
market at that time. The amount of yen funds that remain in the market decrease over
time to reach 250 billion yen four days later, 170 billion yen six days later, 70 billion yen
ten days later, and the yen funds disappears from the market almost completely twenty
days later. Comparing this with the preceding period in which almost 100 percent of
funds are oset two days later, yen funds supplied through interventions tended to stay
in the market much longer during the Great Intervention period.
4.3 Comparison with government payments other than foreign ex-
change interventions
The government pays funds to the private sector in various forms, for example in the
form of pension payments. The supply of yen funds to the market through yen-selling
interventions is just one form of such government payments. If the BOJ did not sterilize
any form of government payments during the period of quantitative easing, then the
previous ndings that interventions were not 100 percent sterilized may not be so
surprising. Therefore we need to know whether or not the central bank distinguishes
between foreign exchange interventions and other government payments, and increases
the degree of nonsterilization in the case of foreign exchange interventions.
We denote net government payments on day t by Gt, and gross government pay-
ments and receipts by GPt and GRt. Specically, the variables GPt and GRt are dened
as GPt  Gt 1(Gt > 0) and GRt  Gt 1(Gt < 0), respectively. Note that the variable
GPt dened here includes only government payments other than yen-selling interven-
tions, although yen-selling interventions are usually included in government payments
11
Table 4: Interventions and Other Government Payments
















Note: See the note for Table 2.
in the statistics released by the BOJ. We estimate modied versions of equation (2):
Rt = + Rt 1 + It 2 + Gt + ut (3)
Rt = + Rt 1 + It 2 + PGPt + RGRt + ut (4)
The coecients  and  in equation (3) (or  and P in equation (4)) should be identical
if the BOJ does not distinguish between interventions and other government payments.
In contrast, if the BOJ does distinguish between them and only leaves interventions
unsterilized, then  should be positive, while  in (3) (or P in (4)) should be equal to
zero.
The estimation results for equations (3) and (4) are presented in the second and
third columns of Table 4. Starting from the result for equation (3), the estimated
value for  is 0.473 and the 95 percent condence interval is 0:294 <  < 0:651.
On the other hand, the estimated value for  is 0.206 and the 95 percent condence
interval is 0:169 <  < 0:242. The condence intervals of  and  do not overlap
each other, implying that the BOJ did distinguish between interventions and other
government payments and oset less for the case of interventions. Turning to the result
for equation (4), the estimate of  is 0.481 and the 95 percent condence interval is
0:304 <  < 0:657, while the estimate of P is 0.240 and the 95 percent condence
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interval is 0:166 < P < 0:313. As before, the extent to which interventions are oset is
smaller than the extent to which other government payments are oset, although the
dierence is not statistically signicant in this case because the condence intervals
slightly overlap each other.
5 Sterilization vs. Nonsterilization: Does It Matter at
Near-Zero Interest Rates?
5.1 Expectation channel of unsterilized interventions on the exchange
rate
To this point, we have examined the relationship between interventions and the BOJ's
monetary operations during the Great Intervention period, and found that about 40
percent of the yen funds injected to the market through yen-selling interventions were
not sterilized on their settlement days, remaining in the market for some time. We now
turn to a basic question: did interventions have dierent eects on the exchange rate
depending on whether they were sterilized or not.
A sterilized yen-selling intervention is nothing but an exchange of yen-denominated
bonds and dollar-denominated bonds between the monetary authorities and the private
sector. On the other hand, an unsterilized intervention is, by denition, the combination
of a sterilized intervention and an injection of yen funds to the market through the
purchase of yen-denominated bonds. To the extent that the injection of yen funds
has an additional eect on the exchange rate by lowering nominal interest rates, an
unsterilized intervention has a greater impact on the exchange rate than a sterilized
one does (See, for example, Sarno and Taylor 2001).
However, Okina and Shiratsuka (2000) and Spiegel (2003) among others argue that
an unsterilized intervention has no extra eects on the exchange rate if the economy
is in a liquidity trap, because an injection of yen funds in such a case has no impacts
on short-term interest rates, which have already reached the zero lower bound anyway.
Put dierently, once money supply exceeds a satiation level, at which the marginal
utility of money is equal to zero, then an additional injection of money does not have
any consequences on the resulting equilibrium.
It is important to note that their argument is based on an implicit assumption
that money supply increases only momentarily; namely, the central bank does not
oset an increase in yen funds resulting from an intervention in the current period, but
fully sterilizes it in the next period, so that an increase in the BOJ's current account
13
balances occurs only in the current period. What will happen if yen funds injected
through interventions remain in the market for longer periods?
Recent discussions about optimal monetary policy in a liquidity trap suggests the
presence of a new expectation channel through which an unsterilized intervention will
have an extra impact on the exchange rate, compared to the case of a sterilized inter-
vention, even if short-term interest rates are currently zero. Suppose that a yen-selling
intervention is conducted when the economy is in a liquidity trap, and that it is not
sterilized not only in the current period but also in the future periods. In other words,
we now think about the case of permanent nonsterilization, which has a permanent
impact on the level of current account balances. An important thing to note is that
the yen funds injected through the intervention remains in the market not only when
the economy is in the trap, but also when the economy recovers to a normal situation
in which the natural rate of interest (i.e., the equilibrium real interest rate) returns to
a normal (positive) level. Market participants expect, prior to observing the interven-
tion, that short-term nominal interest rates will be above zero in the future periods
when the natural rate of interest returns to a positive level. After observing the in-
tervention, they update their expectations in that short-term nominal interest rates
in those future periods will be lower due to the increase in current account balances,
and thus the yen will be lower (i.e., depreciation). This updated expectation yields
a depreciation of the yen in the current period. The importance of this expectation
channel has been emphasized by various researchers, especially by Svensson (2000) and
Jeanne and Svensson (2007).
The above two arguments can be summarized by using a simplied version of
equation (2):
Rt = Rt 1 + It 2 (5)
A momentary nonsterilization corresponds to the case of  > 0 and  = 0. In this case,
a yen selling intervention, which is conducted in period t   2 and settled in period t,
leads to an increase in Rt by It 2 in period t, but does not have any eect on Rt+1.
This is the case discussed by Okina and Shiratsuka (2000) and Spiegel (2003) among
others. On the other hand, a permanent nonsterlization corresponds to the case of
 > 0 and  = 1, in which a yen selling intervention, which is implemented in period
t  2, has eects not only on Rt but also on Rt+1; Rt+2; Rt+3; : : : by the same amount.
However, as we saw in the previous sections,  is neither zero nor unity: it is in
between. In this case, a yen selling intervention in t   2 leads to changes in current
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account balances in and after period t by It 2, It 2, 2It 2, and so on. Suppose
market participants expect, prior to the implementation of a yen selling intervention
in period t  2, that the nominal interest rate will return to a positive level in period
t+j. In this case, an increase in current account balances in period t+j resulting from
the yen-selling intervention in t   2, which is given by jIt 2, would be negligible if
 is far away from unity and/or j is very large. If this is the case, there would be no
signicant dierence between sterilized and unsterilized interventions in their eects on
the current exchange rate. However, if  is suciently close to unity and/or j is not so
large, an unsterilized intervention would have a greater impact on the current exchange
rate than a sterilized intervention does. Thus, it is an empirical question whether there
is a signicant dierence between sterilized and unsterilized interventions in terms of
their eects on the exchange rate.
5.2 Empirical results
We estimate an equation for exchange rate dynamics proposed by Ito (2003, 2004) with
some modication:9
st = 0 + 1st 1 + 2(st 1   sTt 1) + 3(1 Bt)It + 4BtIt + t (6)
where st is the NY close of the yen/dollar exchange rate, and st  st st 1. Following
Ito (2003, 2004), we put a term capturing a short-run bandwagon eect, st 1, and a
term capturing a medium-run mean-reversion eect, st 1   sTt 1, where sT represents
the backward moving average of the yen/dollar rate. Bt is a new variable which takes a
value between zero and one, and represents the degree of nonsterilization on day t+ 2
for the intervention implemented on day t (and settled on day t + 2). Bt is equal to
unity if the intervention is not sterilized at all, and Bt is equal to zero if it is fully
sterilized. Note that the degree of nonsterilization on day t + 2 is not observable on
day t, so that Bt represents an expectation made by market participants on day t. The
term (1  Bt)It represents the amount of sterilized interventions, while the term BtIt
represents the amount of unsterilized interventions.
9Ito (2004) estimates a GARCH-type exchange rate equation, reporting that an intervention of one
trillion yen moves the yen/dollar rate by 0.70 percent in the period prior to the Great Intervention
period (June 1995 to January 2003), but only 0.38 percent during the Great Intervention period
(January 2003 to March 2004). Fatum and Hutchison (2005) estimate the ecacy of interventions
using a matching algorithm, reporting that interventions during the Great Intervention period did not
have any signicant eect on the yen/dollar rate. These results indicate that interventions were less
eective during the Great Intervention period. However, to our knowledge, there is no research about
the dierence between sterilized and unsterilized interventions in terms of their eects on the exchange
rate during this period.
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Table 5: Eects of Sterilized and Unsterilized Interventions on the Yen-Dollar Rate
Bt is dened as the correlation Bt is dened by eq. (7) Bt is dened by eq. (7)
between interventions and changes and k = 0:5 and k = 0:6
in current account balances
2003/1/15-2006/3/9 2003/1/15-2006/3/9 2003/1/15-2006/3/9
Constant -0.0000 -0.0003 -0.0003
(0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0002)
st 1   st 2 -0.0599 -0.0429 -0.0431
(0.0358)* (0.0365) (0.0365)
st 1   sTt 1 0.0071 -0.0050 -0.0050
(0.0052) (0.0041) (0.0041)
(1 Bt)It -0.0005 0.0014 0.0013
(0.0001)*** (0.0020) (0.0020)
BtIt 0.0195 0.0027 0.0029
(0.0064)*** (0.0011)** (0.0012)**
OBS 752 752 752
Note: See the note for Table 2.
We construct Bt in two dierent ways. The rst denition is based on an assump-
tion of backward-looking expectation; specically, we dene Bt as a contemporaneous
correlation coecient between interventions and changes in current account balances
over the last three months. For example, market participants expect that the inter-
vention to be settled two days later is likely to be unsterilized (therefore Bt will be
higher) if they observe a close correlation between the two variables over the last three
months, and vice versa. The second denition is based on an assumption of perfect fore-
sight; namely, we assume that market participants are able to make a perfect forecast
about the degree of nonsterilization on day t+2, Rt+2=It, even on day t. Specically,
we assume that market participants had expected a full nonsterilization, Bt = 1, on
days when the actual value of Rt+2=It turned out to be suciently large, and a full
sterilization, Bt = 0, on the other days. That is, we dene Bt as follows:
Bt =
8<: 1 if Rt+2=It  k0 if otherwise (7)
where k is a parameter taking a value between zero and unity.
The regression results are presented in Table 5, in which the second column shows
the result when Bt is dened as a correlation coecient between interventions and
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changes in current account balances over the last three months, and the third and
fourth columns show the results when Bt is dened as described in equation (7) with
k = 0:5 on the third column and k = 0:6 on the fourth column. The result on the second
column shows that the estimates of 3 and 4 are  0:005 and 0:0190, respectively,
indicating that interventions that are fully sterilized have almost no eect on the
exchange rate, while interventions that are not sterilized at all have a statistically
signicant eect on the exchange rate: a yen-selling intervention of one trillion yen
with no sterilization moves the yen/dollar rate by 1.9 percent.10 These results show
the presence of a substantial dierence between sterilized and unsterilized interventions
in the eects on the exchange rate. In fact, the estimates of 3 and 4 dier at the one
percent signicance level.
Turning to the case in which Bt is dened as in (7), the estimates of 3 and 4
are 0.0014 and 0.0027, respectively, indicating again that sterilized interventions are
not eective while unsterilized ones are eective, although we fail to nd a statistically
signicant dierence between the estimates of 3 and 4. We conrm a similar result
for the case of k = 0:6. In sum, the regression results in Table 5 indicate that, during
the Great Intervention period, interventions had dierent eects on the exchange rate
depending on whether they were sterilized or not, thereby suggesting the possibility
that market participants updated their expectations about future money supply based
on the observation of interventions that were not sterilized.
6 Conclusion
Using daily data on foreign exchange interventions and current account balances at
the Bank of Japan, this paper examined the relationship between interventions and
monetary policy during the period from January 2003 to March 2004. The ndings
can be summarized as follows. First, roughly 60 percent of the funds supplied to the
market through yen-selling foreign exchange interventions were oset (i.e., sterilized)
by monetary adjustment by the Bank of Japan, while the remaining 40 percent were
not oset. Moreover, the funds that were not oset remained in the market for some
time. This result contrasts with the situation before this period, when 100 percent
of the funds of foreign exchange interventions were oset, showing that the extent to
which interventions were not sterilized during January 2003 to March 2004 was quite
remarkable.
10These results imply that a yen-selling intervention with 60 percent sterilization (this is the esti-
mated degree of sterilization in Table 3) of one trillion yen moves the yen/dollar rate by 0.7 percent.
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Second, comparing yen funds supplied through foreign exchange interventions and
yen funds supplied through other government payments (such as pension payments),
it was found that the extent to which such funds remained in the market was greater
and the time span was longer in the case of the former. This suggests that the BOJ
in its monetary operations distinguished between foreign exchange interventions and
other government payments.
Third, an unsterilized yen-selling intervention had a greater impact on the exchange
rate than a sterilized one did during this period, indicating that it matters whether an
intervention is sterilized or not even when the economy is in a liquidity trap. This re-
sult suggests that market participants updated their expectations about future money
supply based on the observations of unsterilized yen-selling interventions.
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Figure 1: Daily amounts of yen-selling interventions  
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Figure 3: Frequency distribution of current account balances  







Note: This figure shows the distribution of daily current account balances during the period of 
January 20, 2004 to March 9, 2006, when the target range was set at 30-35 trillion. To estimate 
the probability density function, we use a normal kernel and the likelihood cross-validation 
method to select the bandwidth (See Silverman 1986).  
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 Figure 4: Contemporaneous correlation between interventions  
































Figure 5: Rolling regression of the degree of nonsterlization 
 
 
Notes: Bold line is the estimated value of β and the dotted lines are the upper and lower bound 
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